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Abstract This article focuses on some principles for understanding. By taking Anna
Mikulak’s article “Mismatches between ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ ways of
knowing and their contributions to public understanding of science” (IPBS 2011) as
a point of departure, the idea of demarcation criteria for scientific and non-scientific
discourses is addressed. Yet this is juxtaposed with mythical thinking, which is
supposed to be the most salient trait of non-scientific discourses. The author
demonstrates how the most widespread demarcation criterion, the criterion of
verification, is self-contradictory, not only when it comes to logic, but also in the
achievement of isolating natural sciences from other forms of knowledge. According
to Aristotle induction is a rhetorical device and as far as scientific statements are
based on inductive inferences, they are relying on humanities, which rhetoric is a
part of. Yet induction also has an empirical component by being based on sense-
impressions, which is not a part of the rhetoric, but the psychology. Also the myths
are understood in a rhetorical (Lévi-Strauss) and a psychological (Cassirer)




To talk about understanding should be an easy task. However it is rather the
opposite. As belonging to the same species understanding is apparently something
the human beings have in common. Yet lack of understanding is probably one of the
most widespread demarcation criteria for discerning groups. Women do not
understand men, adults do not understand adolescents, citizens do not understand
Integr Psych Behav (2011) 45:216–222
DOI 10.1007/s12124-011-9160-0
S. Hroar Klempe (*)
Department of Psychology, NTNU, Trondheim, Norway
e-mail: hroar.klempe@svt.ntnu.nopoliticians and laymen do not understand scientists. This lack of understanding
among the groups is mostly reciprocal. In this respect it is important to investigate
what this lack of understanding between the groups might happen to be about.
This is exactly what Anna Mikulak is attempting at in her article “Mismatches
between ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ ways of knowing and their contributions to
public understanding of science” (IPBS 2011). One of the most interesting aspects of
this article is the author’s perspective on narratives and their structure as having a
role in creating conflicts between these groups. “One dramatic framing device that
easily fits within a typical narrative structure is that of conflict or controversy
between two well-defined groups” (Mikulak 2011 p. 16). This is of course a
fundamental aspect of narratives in general, and it is adopted in media discourses in
several ways. We find it in fiction series, in commercials, in feature articles and even
in the news. There is however one additional aspect that also characterizes these
communicational appearances. That is the aspect of reconciliation that ends the
conflict. This is exactly what appears in Mikulak’s example from Lancet too.
Wakefield et al., (1998) “noted that for eight of the twelve children studied, parents
reported that behavioral symptoms of developmental disorder emerged shortly after
MMR vaccination” (Mikulak 2011 p. 5). Since media also reported this article a
deep conflict was established between the authorities who had made this vaccination
obligatory and the population. This conflicted lasted for a while, but in “February,
2010, The Lancet officially retracted the 1998 Wakefield study” (Mikulak 2011 p. 8).
Then the conflict had got its reconciliation. Yet the conflict was not between
Wakefield et al. and the population, but all the other researchers and the authority on
the one hand and Wakefield et al. and the population on the other.
The mythical
The narrative structure that is stated in this example therefore is the conflict—
resolution structure. Yet there is an additional factor that also seems to count. The
retraction of the article came 12 years after it had been published. The conflict in
other words lasted for a long time, and it was kept alive by bringing in new
perspectives that either supported the one or the other side of the conflict. This is
touching another requirement of contriving a balanced presentation. A feature in a
newspaper is not properly balanced unless it manages to follow up with presenting
several arguments from both sides. This brings in an element of repetition. However
the different arguments do not represent repetition in a strict sense. It is not the same
group that prevails with their arguments all the time, it is rather new groups of
researchers or offended that are introduced to support the one or the other
perspective, and often with new arguments for the same. The narrative structure
therefore is also characterized by an element of variation. By the terms, conflict,
repetition, variation and reconciliation, the structure of the mediated narrative in this
case seems to be captured. These terms however are exactly what the anthropologist
Claude Lévi-Strauss characterized as mythical (Lévi-Strauss, 1963, 1979, 1981).
And of course there are studies that conclude that the mythical structure is a
fundamental and uniting characteristic of different mediated communicational forms
(Klempe 1993).
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Lévi-Strauss that has elaborated this term. His theories are depending very much on
Ernst Cassirer, who introduced the myth in his studies on symbolic forms. Cassirer’s
neo-Kantian perspective is very much dealing with epistemological issues, which
include understanding. On the other hand there is traditionally a sharp distinction
between myths and science, despite the fact that Popper admitted that many
remarkable scientific discoveries have had their origin in mythical thinking (Popper
1961). In Mikulak 2011 the narrative structure that characterizes the mediated
presentation is supposed to stand in opposition to scientific discourses. This is an
assumption of high general acceptance. This implies that the mythical can be
understood as a negative demarcation criterion for scientific discourse. This is
exactly what will be focused on in my paper, namely to examine to what extent
mythical thinking can be regarded as a negative demarcation criterion for science.
Demarcation
The assumption of a certain criterion that can discern scientific from non-scientific
statements is highly associated with logical positivism. Rudolph Carnap was one of
the main figures in that philosophical movement, and he presented the so-called
criterion of verification as the criterion for scientific knowledge (Carnap 1968).
However Carnap was not the first scholar to make a clear and explicit distinction
between scientific and non-scientific knowledge. This has been a part of the whole
history of the theory of science, and can be traced back to Aristotle. His
understanding of the demarcation criterion was very different from how Carnap
defined it, and one may even say that their definitions contradicted each other.
According to Aristotle the general and universal was a necessary requirement for
talking about scientific knowledge. This may probably sound as coinciding with
Carnap, but it does not. Despite the fact that both advocated general knowledge as a
characteristic of scientific knowledge, they had very different opinions about how
this was achieved. Carnap argued for an empirical approach, which implied that
general knowledge was based on observations of the particular. Aristotle on the other
hand stated that the particulars “cannot be objects of scientific knowledge” (Aristotle
Posterior Analytics, Book I, Part 18). Thus the difference between Carnap and
Aristotle is both crucial and critical when it comes to the question of demarcation.
The fundamental question is to what extent science can be defined in terms of the
particular or the universal, i.e. which of them that may count as a point of departure.
The two perspectives represent two different forms of logic. The Aristotelian
logic is always derived from the general to the particular. This implies that the
particular is included, but never as a point of departure. This Aristotelian logic
therefore is characterized by deduction, which is to start with the general and
universal and deduce to the singular and particular, and never the opposite way
round. The latter contradicts deduction, and is called induction, which is to infer
from the singular and particular to the general. Aristotle also often discusses
induction, but in the Analytics, induction has a quite peripheral role. The reason is
quite simple, namely that it is only valid as an inference in two different contexts,
one is in practical learning and the other is in mathematics. In both cases one infer
218 Integr Psych Behav (2011) 45:216–222from the particular to the general. That is easy to do in mathematics because
universals are already embedded in the particular. If a certain number is mentioned,
the whole mathematical system, in which it is a part of, is presupposed at the same
time. When it comes to practical knowledge, we just learn from trial and error; from
our experiences through sensation, and the more we know from sensational
experiences, the better we are in practical skills. Induction, therefore can give us
knowledge, but according to Aristotle, this knowledge is not scientific, but practical
and strongly connected to sensation.
In the Carnapian logic, observations form the point of departure. An observation
is always given through the senses, which implies that an observation is defined in
terms of the particular. Thus induction is with necessity a part of this logic, and this
is the core aspect of the Carnapian demarcation criterion, namely that verification is
depending on observations that can proof that something is true or not. By this
Carnap has changed the logical premises for science. The universals do not form the
point of departure, but it is regarded as an outcome. There are however two
important elements Carnap introduces and includes in science that contrast Aristotle,
and those are the role of sensations and the particular. Also Aristotle mentions these
aspects, but not as a point of departure for logical and scientific inferences.
The places where Aristotle is investigating and elaborating sensation and
induction as a basis for gaining knowledge is in On the Soul and in his Rhetorics,
respectively. Those two theses of Aristotle form the basis for what we today would
call “psychology” and “humanities” respectively. Thus the logic Carnap presented
was not a result of isolating natural sciences from other dubious sciences. This was
probably his aim, but his scientific approach was first of all based on observations,
which is historically based on classical psychology and induction, of which the latter
according to Aristotle primarily belonged to rhetoric; the art of persuasion. Logical
positivism, in other words, represented an approach that was far away from the
traditions of natural sciences, and some of this network’s members took the
consequences. The Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, who was close to this circle
when he wrote his doctoral thesis in the 1920s, developed the unending regress of
observations in his contribution to the philosophy of science. The point was that
research could not be objective unless there is an observer of the scientist’s
behaviour and an observer of the observer etc. (Slagstad 1980). In other words, he
brought the whole problem back to psychology again, and Carnap gave at least up
defending verification as a criterion for demarcation (Carnap 1966). Thus the belief
in induction as a basis for scientific knowledge is from a logical point of view rather
to be regarded as a qualitative than a quantitative approach. This demolishes at least
one important aspect of the notion of demarcation, namely that modern natural
sciences can be regarded as a model for social sciences and humanities.
The myth as a negative demarcation criterion
The one that really introduced myths and mythical thinking as a part of a general
epistemological discussion was Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945). Out of his three
volumes which present “The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms”, the second from
1925 is dedicated to “Mythical Thought” (Cassirer 1955). Cassirer is often presented
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is not true if one think that these references are limited just to Critique of pure
Reason. It is rather the opposite. All the other theses of Kant are much more referred
to, especially Critique of Judgment and not at least his writings in metaphysics.
Hence Critique of Pure Reason is regarded in a broader context, which implies that
the categorical understanding of what is and what is not science is omitted. What is
prevailed however is the fundamental change in thinking that Kant represented; the
Copernican revolution, which implied that acquired knowledge is not regarded as
depending on external, but rather on internal constraints.
With these volumes on Symbolic Forms Cassirer aims at following up Kant’s
Copernican revolution, but he also “strives to broaden it” (Cassirer 1955 p. 29). This
implies first of all that he wants to highlight the internal and subjective constraints
that form our knowledge, but in addition he thinks that mythical thinking is the best
pathway in an investigation of this. What characterizes mythical thinking, however,
is the intuitive understanding of wholeness. “For mythical thinking all contents
crowd together into a single plane of reality; everything perceived possesses as such
a character of reality; the image like the word is endowed with real forces.” (Cassirer
1955 p. 42.) Thus there are no clear distinctions between “mere ‘representation’ and
‘real’ perception, between wish and fulfilment, between image and thing” (Cassirer
1955 p. 36). The mythical perspective therefore eliminates any clear distinctions
between what is true and what is not true knowledge or what is science and what is
not science. Thus when mythical thinking is introduced as a part of epistemology,
the demarcation criterion in theory of science seems to having been eliminated
completely.
This however represents a dangerous position. If all distinctions are eliminated
and we stand left with a pure united wholeness, then all the elements will necessarily
refer to everything and everything will be the same. This implies a sort of
meaningless situation, because meaning in words are depending on distinctions and
oppositions between them. Kant aimed at starting with exactly this united wholeness
in his investigation of the pure reason, but he had no intention of ending up there.
That is also true for Cassirer. He operates with distinctions, but these distinctions are
not given as universals, but are given in their particularities. This is exactly the same
as Peirce ends up with too. When he talks about “fixations of beliefs”, and when he
according to Mikulak describes four different, but lateral approaches to “fix”“ our
beliefs: tenacity, authority, ap r i o i[sic.], and science” Mikulak 2011 p. 4), there are
different forms of knowledge that are situated differently, but without different values.
This is strongly connected to his understanding of semiosis as an endless process.
Carnap too made a close relationship between making meaning and demarcation
criteria; not verifiable statements were regarded as meaningless (Carnap 1968). One
criterion was supposed to be sufficient for drawing a conclusion, and this criterion
was regarded as having universal significance. In semiotics however—whether this
is Peircian or Saussurian based—universality is lifted up to a superior level. Thus to
make meaning out of language is a result of how language is used in terms of its
perceived consequences or oppositions. Meaning therefore is a subjective and
conventionally given entity. This implies that meaning is not a consequence of a
universal criterion, but rather of its actual use. Thus from a semiotic, but also from a
mythical perspective, a dichotomization of understandings, which a demarcation
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a negative demarcation criterion, which the mythical very often is regarded to be.
Research dissemination
In this sense the case mentioned by Mukilak is of certain interest. It shows very
clearly that the fundamental conflict is not primarily between scientists and non-
scientists, but rather among scientists. This coincides not only with a semiotic
perspective on meaning, but also with the Kuhnian understanding of how scientific
knowledge is progressing. The basic suggestion in the logic of scientific revolutions
is that also scientists prefer stability. However both the pragmatic thesis of Peirce
and the Saussurian thesis of the arbitrary sign imply that stability is only achievable
within a limited group for a limited span of time. Our conceptions of terms are
changing, but the closer a group is, the slower will changes occur. No one can escape
from changes, but well-defined groups can prevent themselves for a while, and
through this apparently obtain stability. If scientific groups manage to do this, they
will easily appear as trustworthy and reliable and by this be well accepted by
governmental institutions. This will of course give them a kind hegemony and they
will easily dominate the picture of research disseminations.
In this perspective it is difficult to talk about “the two cultures”. There are many
of them, but some few seem to dominate, because experts are apparently
representing one group, laypeople will consequently form another. In this respect
the “deficit model” for research dissemination is also problematic. According to
Mikulak it says that “the reason people do not understand a particular scientific
concept, or science more generally, is because they do not have sufficient
information to do so” (Mikulak 2011 p. 7). This perspective presupposes a linear
and mono causal relationship between addresser and addressee. This understanding
of media is what scholars have regarded as historically limited to the first half of the
twentieth century; the phase of all-powerful media (McQuail 1994). However also
the audience are acting, and therefore “understanding arises from a two-way
negotiation of meaning between expert approaches to knowledge and lay approaches
to knowledge” (Mikulak 2011 p.10). This is an important correction of the “deficit
model”, and it underlines what is the semiotic and mythical understanding of the
relationship between researchers and non-researchers, namely that there are no
general principle that can tell the differences, but the differences in understandings
appear between individuals. Thus an attempt at making a clear distinction between
scientific discourse and research dissemination is embedded with the same problems
as demarcation criteria.
Conclusions
On the one hand there is of course an immense difference between scientific and
mythical discourses. Both Cassirer and Lévi-Strauss underline this fact. However
what both of the two also underline is that mythical thinking is fundamental to all
human being. The question therefore is rather how far a discourse can be distanced
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some reminiscences of mythical structures in scientific discourses too. On a more
abstract level scientific discourses are characterized by two variants of rhetorical
styles: conflict and confirmation. Because scientific discourse is characterized by
preciseness each contribution does not reflect much more of mythical thinking than
exactly these initial mythical aspects. In a bigger scale the elements of conflict,
repetition, variation and resolution is present though, at least to a certain extent. This
is probably most true when it comes to genres like articles and journals. This is not
so much because of the genres themselves, but rather because a considerable growth
in quantum may have influenced the form of these scientific genres. A vast amount
of scientific articles will with necessity bring in an aspect of repetition, but also
variation. A similar growth of journals presupposes and produces an aspect of
conflict between different research groups. Resolutions may also occur, like the
withdrawal of an article in Lancet Mikulak referred to. Thus one of the most
fundamental problems with lack of understanding between scientists and non-
scientists is probably more connected to a deficient in self-reflection in both groups.
By not realizing all the irrational elements that unavoidably permeates discourses,
either they are scientific or non-scientific, misunderstandings will by necessity occur
as a salient trait of them.
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